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I. Statement of jurisdiction. 
This is an appeal from a final order of a juvenile court. Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)(c) confers this Court with jurisdiction over "appeals from juvenile courts[.]" 
II. Statement of issues presented for review, applicable standard of review and 
preservation of issue. 
A. Standards of review. 
This appeal involves three standards of review: 
1. Correctness standard of review. 
The failure to apply correct statutory considerations and/or improper application of 
statutory provisions are issues of law which are reviewed for correctness. In re HJ., 
1999 UT App 238, iJ 15, 986 P.2d 115. The ineffectiveness trial-level Guardian Ad 
Litem is also a matter for the correctness standard. Cf In re MM., 2003 UT 54, iJ 2, 59 
P.3d 603. 
2. Termination of parental rights standard of review. 
"Because the termination of parental rights is fact sensitive, [the court] review[s] 
Ci the fact of the controversy in detail." In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10, iJ 1 n.3, 268 P.3d 831 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. deni(4d, 280 P.3d 421 (Utah 2012). 
Whether a parent's rights should be terminated presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. ... Thus, in order to overturn the juvenile court's 
decision "[t]he result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or 
leave the appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake 
has been made." ... Therefore, in this case the juvenile court's decision 
could be overturned only if it either failed to consider all of the facts or 
considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear 
weight of the evidence. . .. 
In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, iJ 12, 171 P.3d 435. 
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3. Duty to rule standard of review. 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.' The findings 
of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The findings 'should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."' 
State v. 633 E. 640 North, 942 P .2d 925, 931, (Utah 1997). If anything, this Court more 
closely scrutinizes orders denying tennination for best-interests, given this Court's 
instructions to trial courts to go to "extra lengths" to prepare findings for appellate review 
in those rare cases where it would not serve a child's best interests to terminate. In re 
MC., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
B. Issues presented for review. 
A. Did the juvenile court err by failing to apply the best interests and 
stability/permanence analyses mandated by Utah Code sections 78A-6-509{l)(b) and 
62A-4a-103(2)(b)? This issue was preserved by statutory mandates, by Mother's 
evidence presented at trial, by Mother's trial memorandum, and by Mother's counsel's 
argument (Tr. at 420-438, 452-453), including Mother's counsel's rebuttal argument to 
the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's argument(s). Tr. at 448-453. Further, appellate-level 
Guardian Ad Litem recognizes that this issue has been preserved. Guardian Ad Litem's 
Response to Mother's Petition on Appeal, at 6. Standard of Review: Correctness 
standard. In re HJ., 1999 UT App 238, ,r 15. 
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B. Did the juvenile court err by misapplying Utah Code section 78A-6-
503(4), (7), and (l0)(b) as its best interests factors? This issue and its sub-issues were 
preserved by statutory mandates, by Mother's evidence presented at trial, by Mother's 
trial memorandum, and by Mother's counsel's argument (Tr. at 420--438, 452--453), 
including Mother's counsel's rebuttal argument to the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's 
argument(s). Tr. at 448--453. Further, appellate-level Guardian Ad Litem recognizes that 
this issue has been preserved. Guardian Ad Litem' s Response to Mother's Petition on 
Appeal, at 2. Standard of Review: Correctness standard. In re HJ., 1999 UT App 238, 1 
15. 
1. In misapplying Utah Code section 78A-6-503(4), (7), and 
( 1 0)(b ), did the juvenile court violate established law? Standard of Review: Correctness 
standard. In re HJ., 1999 UT App 23 8, 1 15. 
2. In erroneously seeking to find a possibility that Father could 
become a fit parent, did the court violate its duty to rule? Standard of Review: Duty to 
rule standard. In re MC., 940 P.2d at 1236-37. 
C. Was the juvenile court's best evidence ruling contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence? This issue and its sub-issues were preserved by statutory 
mandates, by Mother's evidence presented at trial, by Mother's trial memorandum, and 
by Mother's counsel's argument (Tr. at 420-438, 452-453), including Mother's 
counsel's rebuttal argument to the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's argument(s). Tr. at 
<i 448--453. Further, appellate-level Guardian Ad Litem recognizes that this issue has been 
preserved. Guardian Ad Litem's Response to Mother's Petition on Appeal, at 13. 
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Standard of Review: Termination of parental rights standard. In re. B.R., 2007 UT 82, 1 
12. 
D. Were Mother's case and the child's best interests prejudiced by 
ineffective assistance of trial-level Guardian Ad Litem and by the Guardian's 
misrepresentations of law to the court? This issue was preserved by statutory mandates, 
by Mother's evidence presented at trial, by Mother's trial memorandum, and by Mother's 
counsel's argument (Tr. at 420-438, 452-453), including Mother's counsel's rebuttal 
argument to the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's argument(s). This issue was also 
preserved by the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's statement to the Court that she knew 
nothing about the involved child (Tr. at 191), and Mother's counsel's alerting the court 
that the Guardian's office was improperly categorically opposing terminations whenever 
there was not an adopting father in the wings (as in Mother's case). Tr. at 451-452. 
Further, appellate-level Guardian Ad Litem recognizes that this issue has been preserved. 
Guardian Ad Litem's Response to Mother's Petition on Appeal, at 14, n. 8. Tr. at 448-
453. Standard of Review: Correctness standard. In re MM., 2003 UT 54, 12. 
III. Constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative or of central importance to the appeal. 
Determinative or of central importance are Utah Code sections 62A-4a-103(2)(b ); 
78A-6-503(4), (7), (lO)(b); 78A-6-507; 78A-6-508, and 78A-6-509(l)(b), which are 
included in the Addendum at pages 63-70. 
IV. Statement of the case. 
A. Nature of case, course of proceedings and disposition in juvenile court. 
12 
This is a tennination of parental rights action regarding GJC filed by Petitioner-
@ Appellant (Mother) on May 1, 2014 in the Juvenile Court of the First Judicial District in 
and for Box Elder County. Trial occurred on January 28-30, 2015, with the juvenile 
court announcing its ruling from the bench on January 30, 2015. Despite finding five 
different grounds to terminate the parental rights ofRespondent-Appellee ("Father"), 
including unfitness, the juvenile court declined to terminate Father's rights to the 
involved minor, GJC. The juvenile court found that termination of Father's parental 
rights was not in the child's best interests and dismissed Mother's petition. Final order 
was entered on May 15, 2015. There were no post-trial motions and Mother filed her 
@ notice of appeal on May 22, 2015. 
B. Statement of relevant facts with citations to record. 
1. This appeal concerns GJC, the son of Mother and Father, who was 
born in March 2008 during the parties' marriage. Exhibit 9 at 066. The parties separated 
in approximately June 2009. Id. at 067. From the time of the parties' separation to the 
time of trial Mother and GJC.continuously resided with, and in the home of, Mother's 
parents N.B. (grandfather) and M.B. (grandmother) in Brigham City. Tr. at 237-238. 
Mother filed for divorce in July 2009. Stipulated temporary orders in the divorce action 
entered in September 2009 granted Mother sole physical custody and granted Father the 
minimum statutory schedule parent time. Exhibit 9 at 066.1 GJC was two years old in 
2010 when critical incidents herein occurred and GJC is currently seven years old. 
1 All of Mother's exhibits were offered and admitted into evidence at the beginning of 
trial. Tr. at 11-12; Exhibits 1-22. 
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2. In October 2009 Mother obtained a permanent protective order 
against Father based upon threats made by Father against Mother and her family. Exhibit 
5. The protective order provided that Father would continue to have visitation in 
accordance with the temporary orders issued in the divorce action, but with third parties 
to assist with the exchange of the child between the parties. Id. Only communications 
regarding the child were excepted from the protective order. Id. 
3. Father was displeased with statutory minimum parent time, but did 
not use judicial process to address his displeasure. Rather, between October 2009 and 
October 20 IO Father repeatedly violated the parent-time provisions of the temporary 
orders by failing to return GJC to Mother after Father's scheduled visits. Tr. at 15-48; 
234-270; 152-170; Exhibit 18. Father's disobediences of the parent-time order, 
accompanying threats, and unlawful actions substantially increased during the summer of 
2010. 
4. On the evening of July 1, 2010 when Father again refused to return 
GJC to Mother following a visit, Mother's attorney Brandon Baxter messaged Father (pro 
se in the divorce action) reminding Father that he had promised to return GJC to Mother. 
Tr. at 24-25; Exhibit 18 at 0881-0883. Father responded to Mr. Baxter, "Go f_k 
yourself do not call or text me". Id. Father then four times messaged Mother, "Your 
lack of effort in working things out will not just hurt me any more[,]" "Come on 
keep screwing me[,]" "You ungrateful heartless bitch(,]" and "Go ahead ruin my life 
now[.]" Tr. at 26-27; Exhibit 18. at 0884-887. Mother and her attorney reported these 
violations of Mother's protective order to law enforcement officials (Tr. at 22, 30-33), 
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and on August 25, 2010, criminal charges of three counts of violating a protective order 
~ were filed against Father. Exhibit 8 at 0040-0041. Father would subsequently, on May 9, 
2011, plead no contest to these charges. Id. 
5. On July 19, 2010, Father messaged Mr. Baxter: "This approach 
may cost your family and hers more than your willing to wager its not smart to try 
and corner a resourceful man" Exhibit 18 at 0888.; Tr. at 30-33. Alarmed at having 
received direct threats to the safety of his family as well as himself, Mr. Baxter, on July 
19, 2010, reported Father's threat to law enforcement officials. Id. 
6. On August 10, 2010, Father yet again refused to return GJC to 
@ Mother at the end of his parent-time, wrongly withholding the child from Mother for 
eight days and requiring Mother to apply to the divorce court for a Writ of Assistance. 
Tr. at 34-37; Exhibit 8 at 0049, Exhibit 10 at 0588. Continuing to withhold the child in 
contempt of the divorce court orders, on August 18, 2010, Father appeared at a schedule4 
hearing before Commissioner Garnett. Tr. at 34-40. Exhibit 8 at 028-029. At the 
hearing, the commissioner declared that Father's message to Mr. Baxter could only be 
construed as a threat against Mr. Baxter and his family (Exhibit 10 at 0587) and ordered 
Father "to immediately cease all threatening communications, whether veiled or outright, 
made against [Mother] or her attorney or their families." Id. at 0589. The Court also 
certified issues of contempt of court against Father, including Father's absolute refusal to 
pay child support. Id. Commissioner Arnett ordered Father to advise the court as to the 
location of the child, and, upon Father telling the commissioner that the child was with 
Father's mother, ordered that the child remain with Father's mother, and that Father wait 
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at the court while officers, with the Writ of Assistance, were sent to accompany Mother 
to Father's mother's home to retrieve GJC. Id. at 0588; Tr. 255-256; Exhibit 8 at 029. 
Father was subsequently charged with criminal custodial interference regarding this 
incident and, on November 28, 2011, was convicted at bench trial. Exhibit 8 at 049. 
7. On September 28, 2010, the last scheduled day for another of 
Father's parent-time periods with GJC, Father messaged Mother as follows: "I tried the 
nice way no more f_k you eat shit you f_ked up and you will feel it for the rest of 
your life I treat you like the piece of shit you are You want to get between me and 
my son f_k you And any family members of yours that come around me will be 
treated like a equal piece of shit i will make sur~ they never want to see me or deal 
with" Tr. at 240-241; Exhibit 19 at 0891. On the same day Father messaged Mother's 
parents (who were to facilitate the exchange of GJC), "Because of what your daughter 
has done i do not wish to see or talk to you or anyone else in your family if you 
ignore this it will not be pleasan Your not welcome to ever call me piss off and stay 
out of my business"2 Tr. at 241-242; Exhibit 18 at 0894-0895. 
8. On September 29, 20 I 0, Father again refused to return GJC to 
Mother (Exhibit 8 at 0063); an offense regarding which Father would also be charged 
with custodial interference and convicted, following bench trial on November 28, 2011. 
Id. At this time, and for days following while he was yet again kidnapping GJC, Father 
2 Among other things, Father's texts to Mother and her parents on September 28, 2010 
violated Commissioner Arnett's August 18, 2010 order restraining Father from making 
direct or veiled threats to Mother or her family ( as well as Mother's attorney and his 
family). 
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@ 
demanded by texts that Mother speak personally to Father by phone. Exhibit 18 at 0814-
@ 0879. Mother repeatedly texted Father demanding that he return GJC to her. On 
September 30, 2010, Father texted, "This is the last text I will send to you i will erase 
every text you send and not read them you may call me if you need to talk period." 
Exhibit 18 at 0856-0857. Mother messaged that she would only communicate by text or 
email and that Father should phone Mother's attorney ifhe wanted to use telephone. Id. 
at 0860-0861. During the following days Father repeatedly left voicemail messages with 
Mother. On October 2, 2010, Father texted Mother that he would call Mother around 
4:00 p.m. and that "G[JC] wants to talk to ya He misses his mommy babe". Id. at 
@ 0867-869. Father thereafter delivered a voicemail to Mother with Father saying, "Tell 
your mommy to come get you"' while GJC cried in the background, "Mommy, please 
come get me." Tr. at 257-258. Father admitted this voicemail, but denied the content. 
Tr. at 136. 
9. On October 5, 2010, Mother applied for another Writ of Assistance 
(Exhibits 11 and 12). As reflected on the certificates of service, on October 5, 2010, 
Mother's attorney emailed to Father copies of the application, proposed order, and 
proposed writ of assistance. Id. The order and writ were signed on October 6, 2010. Id. 
10. On October 6, 2010, before the writ of assistance had been delivered 
to law enforcement, Father called Mother's parents, N.B. and M.B., telling them that 
Father would bring GJC to Syracuse, 3 and would there deliver GJC to Mother's parents at 
3 Father had continued to reside in Salt Lake County after Mother and GJC went to live 
with Mother's parents in Brigham City. 
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an arranged location. Tr. at 141-142, 160-162. Using GJC as the bait, Father thus 
undertook his plan to kidnap Mother and her parents. Id. Father left GJC with Father's 
sister and proceeded to Syracuse. Tr. at 69-79, 162-170, 263-270, 325-328. Mother's 
parents had dropped Mother off at a store while they went to pick up GJC from Father. 
Id. When they arrived at the location, Father suddenly jumped into their car, demanded 
that they take Father to talk to Mother, and, among other things threatened N.B. and M.B. 
with a handgun. Id. When M.B. jumped out of the car at a stop sign, Father exited the 
car, put the gun in M.B.'s face and told M.B. to get back in the car or Father would shoot 
M.B. M.B. ran away from Father. Id. Father had N.B. drive Father back and then fled 
the scene, ultimately being apprehended in Wendover, Nevada. Exhibit 2 at 003-004, all 
emphases added. Id. During the kidnapping incident Father violated Mother's protective 
order by demanding that N.B. and M.B. take Father to Mother and by speaking to Mother 
on M.B. 's cell phone. Tr. at 132-133, 162-165. After being misled by Father's mother 
and Father's sister (Tr. at 268-269, 343, 362-63; Exhibit 17 at 917), law enforcement 
officers found GJC in the possession of Father's sister. 
11. In the victim impact statement of the AP&P report, both N.B. and 
M.B. likened Father to Josh Powell and expressed their fears of Father. Exhibit 2 at 006. 
At trial in January 2015, grandparents N.B. and M.B. and Mother continued to have the 
same fears and concerns. Tr. at 168-169, 187, 270. 
12. In the weeks following the kidnappings, N.B. applied for and 
obtained a protective order against Father to protect N.B. and M.B .. Exhibit 4. Mother 
applied for and obtained a child protective order to protect GJC. Exhibit 6. The court 
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found that Mother at time of trial continued to have "a very real subjective fear of 
[Father]." Tr. at 468. 
13. Father was charged with two counts of kidnapping on October 7, 
2010. Exhibit 8 at 070-071. On December 6, 2011, Father pleaded guilty to two counts 
of attempted kidnapping, third degree felonies. Id. 
14. In addition to the July 1, 2010 protective order violations, Father 
had, by June 2011, been arrested or charged with nine new criminal offenses (in addition 
to the July 1 protective order violations). Id. at 010; Tr. at 120-127. Father failed to 
follow through with AP&P meeting and reporting requirements. On November 15, 2011, 
@ while out on bail pending plea and sentencing in the kidnappings cases, Father tested 
positive for methamphetamines and was sent by AP &P to Volunteers of America 
Detoxification Center. Exhibit 2 at 005-006; Tr. at 78. At said time, Father had "open 
sores all over his head, which is indicative of an individual using methamphetamines." 
Exhibit 2 at 005-006; Tr. at 78. 
15. On December 6, 2011, Father entered guilty pleas to two counts of 
attempted kidnapping, third degree felonies. Exhibit 8 at 070-071. On December 15, 
2011, Father failed to report to AP&P for his presentence interview. Id. at 006. In 
January 2012, Father failed to report to APP. Id. In February 2012, AP&P could not 
obtain a substance abuse treatment update because Father did not sign a release of 
information form for APP. Id. On February 29, 2012, Father failed to appear for 
sentencing. Exhibit 8 at 085-086. Father was picked up by law enforcement on March 
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2, 2012 (id.) and held pending sentencing on March 21, 2012, (id.) upon which Father 
was directly committed to prison for up to five years. Id. 
16. Despite being admitted to a prison drug treatment program, Father 
promptly violated the program's conditions by possessing controlled substances in 
prison. Tr. at 102-106. Following this expulsion, prior to trial herein on January 28-30, 
2015, Father was twice more admitted to, and twice more expelled from, prison drug 
treatment programs. Id. At trial, Father testified that he had no intention of again 
attempting to receive drug treatment as he did not consider drugs to be the reason he was 
sent to prison. Tr. at 106. Father has never received psychological therapy. Tr. at 93-
94, 108. Father testified that, due to his continuous violations of prison rules, Father 
expected to serve his full five-year term. Tr. at 143. Accordingly, upon release, Father 
would not be under AP &P supervision. 
17. Mother's expert (Charles H. Sharp II) testified that Father met all the 
criteria for antisocial personality disorder, a deep-seated disorder that can only be 
addressed through long-term therapy. Tr. at 202-233. He testified that being exposed to 
a person with antisocial personality disorder is a major factor in a person acquiring the 
disorder (Tr. at 217), thus making it in GJC's best interests that Father's parental rights 
be terminated. Tr. at 217-219, 233. 
18. Father had continuously refused to pay his $462.004 per month child 
support or to contribute to GJC's medical insurance or medical expenses before he was 
4 The combined monthly support obligation with Father's $50.25 portion of child's 
medical insurance premium was/is $512.25. Exhibit 10 at 090. The single thousand 
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imprisoned. Tr. at 20-22, 38-39, 98-99, 114, 124, 153-55, 170-172, 184-185, 191, 271-
~ 272, 331-332, 376. As of December 4, 2013, Father's ORS balance was $19,987.50 (Tr. 
at 124; Exhibit 8 at Doc 094-95), and Father had not paid any support since such date. 
Father admitted that his child support payments "wer~ token at best." Tr. at 376. 
19. Father had had no contact with GJC since before being committed to 
prison in March 2012. Tr. at 101, 300. Between October 2010 and February 2012, 
Father had been restricted to guarded, supervised visits. Exhibit 15 at O 1080; Tr. at 299. 
20. The parties were divorced by bifurcated decree entered January 7, 
2011. Exhibit 14. Mother had not remarried. However, N.B. and M.B. testified that they 
@ had a several million dollar net worth and would assure that GJC would ( continue to) be 
cared for financially upon termination of Father's parental rights. Tr. at 170-171, 331. 
Further, these witnesses and Mother testified that Mother and GJC had lived together 
with grandparents N.B. and M.B. in N.B.'s and M.B.'s home for over five years (Tr. at 
157, 237-38), and that during that time N.B. had served as a father figure to GJC. Tr. at 
173-174, 305. N.B. and M.B. testified that, as of January 2005, GJC was a happy bright 
little boy. Tr. at 191, 340-341. However, N.B. and Mother testified that GJC was very 
traumatized by the 2010 events. Tr. at 159, 257-258, 309. 
21. Father testified that he had sent cards to GJC from prison. Tr. at 
296, 341. Mother testified that she withheld from GJC the few cards received from 
Father and that she had made no efforts to allow GJC to visit Father's mother or other 
dollar payment was made in order to get Mother to agree to continue a hearing date on 
Mother's OTSC. Tr. at 22. 
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members of Father's extended family. Tr. at 341, 343. Father's mother and members of 
Father's extended family had not seen GJC for three years (since Father's last supervised 
visit in February 2012). Tr. 313-314, 343. 
22. Father's mother testified that GJC was Father's mother's first 
grandchild. Tr. at 349-351. Father's mother testified that Mother would not respond to 
calls from Father's mother (Tr. at 353) or acknowledge receipt of gifts for GJC on the 
doorstep of Mother's (and N.B.'s and M.B.'s home) after Father was in prison. Tr. at 354. 
23. The juvenile court found that Mother had, by clear and convincing 
evidence, proved each of the following grounds for termination of Father's parental 
rights: abandonment, neglect, unfitness, token efforts to support or communicate, token 
efforts to avoid being an unfit parent. Tr. at 475-477; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order at ,r 32. 
24. However, the juvenile court ruled that it would not be in the best 
interests of the minor child to terminate Father's parental rights. Id. at ,r 33; Tr. at 477-
479. 
V. Summary of arguments. 
A. In reaching its best interests ruling, the juvenile court failed to apply 
mandatory factors and principles from Utah Code sections 78A-6-509(l)(b) and 62A-4a-
103(2)(b). The best interests ruling must be reversed because the court did not consider 
Father's lack of efforts adjust; failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical 
care and maintenance; failure to maintain regular parent-time or other contact with the 
child; and failure to maintain regular contact and communication with the custodian of 
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@ 
@ 
the child. Further, the court did not consider the overriding policy of providing the child 
@ stability and permanence. 
B. In reaching its best interests ruling, the juvenile court misapplied Utah 
Code subsections 78A-6-503(4), (7), and lO(d), which apply to termination grounds in 
marginal unfitness cases; not to best interests analysis, as in this case, of extreme parental 
unfitness. Misapplying these subsections to its best interests analysis, the juvenile court 
erroneously concluded that GJC's best interests were against termination of Father's 
parental rights, because there was a possibility that GJC could benefit from continued 
association with Father or Father's extended family. In misapplying the subsections (Tr. 
® at 473-475, 478), the juvenile court's ruling ignored the governing statutory principles 
discussed immediately above, violated numerous rulings of this Court, and violated its 
duties to rule on material factual issues. 
C. The juvenile court's best interests finding was contrary to the weight of the 
evidence because the same clear and convincing evidence supporting terminations 
grounds proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that GJC's best interests required that 
Father's parental rights be terminated. Further, the court's irrelevant rulings that GJC 
could benefit from a relationship with Father's extended family, and that GJC did not 
suffer as a result of Father's actions were also contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
D. Mother's case and GJC's best interests were prejudiced by ineffective 
representation of GJC by the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem and by the Guardian Ad 
@ Litem' s misrepresentation of law to the juvenile court. 
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VI. Argument. 
From overwhelming clear and convincing evidence, the juvenile court found that 
Mother had proved as separate grounds for termination that Father had abandoned GJC, 
that Father had neglected GJC, that Father was unfit as a parent to care for GJC's 
emotional health and development, that Father had made only token efforts to support or 
communicate with GJC, and that Father had made only token efforts to avoid being an 
unfit parent.5 Tr. at 475-477. Father had been convicted of many offenses, including 
violating Mother's protective order against Father (while wrongfully withholding GJC 
from Mother during Mother's parent time), twice committing custodial interferences 
involving GJC, and, at gunpoint, kidnapping GJC's maternal grandparents in a foiled 
attempt to force them to take Father to Mother (in violation of Mother's protective order). 
Tr. at 119-132, 163-166. In finding Father unfit as a parent, the court stated," ... the 
crime that Mr. Cronin has been convicted of is such a nature as to prove his unfitness in 
caring for the child's emotional health and development. I can't imagine what pain this 
little boy would be in if you (Father) ... had harmed or killed his grandparents." Tr. at 
476. Before making such finding, the court had found that- after being convicted of 
violating Mother's protective order (Tr. at 119, Exhibit 8 at 040); after being twice 
convicted of criminal custodial interferences involving GJC (Tr. at 120-12.3, 460, Exhibit 
8 at 049, 063); after having pleaded guilty to the felony attempted kidnapping of GJC's 
maternal grandparents (Tr. at 463, Exhibit 8 at 070); and after having "three times been 
booted out of rehab programs in the prison" (Tr. at 105, 463-464) (while refusing to 
5 See Utah Code§ 78A-6-507(I)(a)-(c), (t)(i)-(ii). 
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@ 
acknowledge his drug dependency issues {Tr. at 78, 103-105; Exhibit 1 at 044))-
i> Father had never, including during the involved trial, shown any credible remorse (Tr. at 
463); the alarming trait that caused Adult Probation and Parole to recommend Father's 
commitment to prison three years before the involved trial. 6 Yet, the juvenile court 
erroneously failed to order the termination of Father's parental rights. 
A. The juvenile court erred by failing to apply best interests and 
stability/permanence considerations mandated by statutes and 
related appellate court decisions. 
In its best interests analysis, the juvenile court failed to apply mandatory principles 
from Utah Code sections 78A-6-509(l)(b) and 62A-4a-103(2)(b). 
1. The juvenile court failed to apply§ 78A-6-509(l)(b) factors. 
6 See AP&P agent Carter's testimony at Tr. at 73-76; Presentence Addendum Report, 
Exhibit 2 at AP0001-AP0007, including at AP0005 ("He takes a victim's stance as all 
of his problems are the result of the actions of other people. In his written statement, 
he does not mention use of a handgun or the threats he made to the victims. . . . He 
believes he has the right to have contact with this child and his rights supersede any 
Court order to the contrary." (emphasis added)) and at AP 0002 ("[Father's] attitude 
towards this criminal episode and his minimizing the long term effects his actions have 
had on the victims is of grave concern" (emphasis added)), which the juvenile court 
found "extremely compelling." Tr. at 462. At trial Father continuously assumed the 
position of victim and never accepted responsibility. See Tr. at 142-143 ("A .... I've 
only had visitation taken away from me. I've never taken excess visitation. All these 
allegations of me with custodial interference and this that are -- are -- Q. You've been 
railroaded. A. -- are just simply -- railroaded, absolutely. This is -- Q. You've been 
railroaded. Every single court, every single judge, every single ruling -- A. You've put 
the pieces of the puzzle together, absolutely."). See also, Tr. at 73-75, 79, 89, 100 and 
104-105 (refusing to acknowledge use of gun in kidnapping and drug problem), 112-
116, 119-120, 128-132, 137-143, 146-149, 176-178, 377 ("I'm not a violent person and 
never have."), 382-383 ("this [Father's incarceration] is God's plan ... what we needed 
at this point in our lives ... "), 3 84 ("the most devastating thing I've ever dealt with"); 
349, 445-447 ("This was never premeditated. I never intended to threaten these people .. 
. . it's not who I am). 
25 
In its best interests ruling, the juvenile court failed to consider, under Utah Code § 
78A-6-509(l)(b), "the effort the parent ... [has] made to adjust [his] circumstances, 
conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to return him to his home ... , 
including, (i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and 
maintenance, if financially able; (ii) maintenance of regular parent-time or other contact 
with the child ... ; and (iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the 
custodian of the child." "Although Utah Code section 78A-6-509 does not expressly 
refer to the best interest prong of the termination analysis, '[t]he connection of the 
specified factors with the best interests of the child is plain.' In re J.D., 2011 UT 184, ,r 
15, 257 P.3d 1062 (quoting In re T. WH. 2004 UT App 128[U], para. 5 (mem.) (per 
curium)). The "effort to adjust" factor "at minimum [among all factors]" must be 
considered in best interests analysis. In re A.M 0., 2014 UT App 171, ,r 17, 332 P.3d 372 
(citing In re D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, i 10,266 P.3d 844) (emphasis added). 
The uncontradicted evidence was, and the court found, that Father had made no 
efforts whatsoever to positively adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions (Tr. at 
464), and that, r~ther, Father had worsened his situation since 2010. Tr. at 78, 105, 463-
465. Further, the uncontradicted evidence was, and the court found by clear and 
convincing evidence, that Father had not paid a reasonable portion of substitute physical 
care and maintence, and that Father had not maintained regular parent-time or other 
regular contact and communication with the child or Mother. Tr. at 124, 376, 476. Yet, 
the juvenile court's ruling did not follow through with section 78A-6-509(l)(b) analysis 
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to logically determine that the best interests of GJC obviously required that Father's 
@ parental rights be terminated. 
2. The juvenile court failed to apply§ 62A-4a-103(2)(b) stability 
and permanence principles. 
Utah Code section 62A-4a-103(2)(b) provides that, upon grounds for child 
protection being established, the Division of Child and Family Services shall act "to 
provide the child with a stable, permanent environment." "Thus, the overriding policy 
concern is to achieve permanency for [the] children, especially once a parent is 
determined unfit." In re J.P., 921 P.2d 1012, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). (emphasis 
added.) Yet, the juvenile court never considered the overriding policy concern of 
G.J.C.'s need for stability and permanence. The uncontradicted evidence was that GJC 
had, at time of trial for over five years, lived with Mother, N.B. and M.B.; that GJC had 
not seen Father without guarded supervision since October 6, 2010 (the date Father 
absconded to Wendover after attempting to kidnap GJC's grandparents;Tr. at 147); and 
GJC had not seen Father at all since February 2012. Tr. at 149. The uncontradicted 
~ evidence was that Father had utterly failed to adjust to allow Father to properly parent 
GJC (Tr. at 463-465), leaving Father the same dangerous felon he was when he entered 
prison.7 To not tenninate Father's parental rights would leave GJC at risk of future 
contact with Father (still utterly unable to comprehend, or restrain, his "victimhood" 
behaviors (see supra note 6)); leave GJC at obvious risk involvement in Father's future 
@ 7 The court stated, "But I think there is a severe lack of follow-through there to get 
himself in a situation where his mental health is such as to be stable and healthy and 
productive." Tr. at 465. 
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disobediences of court orders and crimes; and leave GJC at risk of Father obtaining 
custody of GJC were Mother to die or be unable to parent GJC. In re A.M 0., 2014 UT 
App 171 at n.7. The juvenile court's ruling subverted GJC's overriding need for stability 
and permanency. Indeed, the court's failure to apply the foregoing statutory factors led to 
all of the court's errors addressed herein. 
B. The juvenile court misapplied statutory principles applicable to 
termination grounds in situations of marginal unfitness. 
Failing to apply the standards discussed immediately above, the juvenile court 
erroneously found that, because there was a possibility that GJC could benefit from 
continued association with Father or Father's extended family, it was contrary to GJC's 
best interests to terminate father's parental rights. Tr. at 478. The court reached its 
erroneous conclusions by referring to, and misapplying, Utah Code subsections 78A-6-
503(4), (7), and l0(d). Tr. at 470--473, 477--479. These subsections declare parental 
rights policies that apply to grounds for termination and kinship placement, but that do 
not apply to best interests prong determinations. 8 See subsection (7) "Until parental 
unfitness is established ... " The subsections caution courts to use caution in cases of 
marginal parental unfitness. Subsection ( 4) of section 78A-6-503 states that the parent's 
fundamental liberty interest regarding care, custody and management of the parent's child 
does not "cease to exist simply because a parent may fail to be a model parent ... " 
( emphasis added) Subsection (7) states, "Until parental unfitness is established and the 
children suffer, or are substantially likely to suffer, serious detriment as a result, the child 
8 See appellate-level Guardian Ad Litem's legislative history at pages 2-6 of Guardian 
Ad Litem Response to Mother's Petition on Appeal. 
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@ 
and the child's parent share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their 
@ relationship ... " Subsection (7) does not impose a showing of suffering or detriment by 
@ 
the child for purposes of best interests analysis as such would violate established law.9 
Subsection (l0)(d) states that the interests of the state favor preservation of 
familial bonds "in situations where a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship can 
exist, including extended family association and support." This section applies to 
situations of less-than-model-parents who would border on unfitness but for extended 
family assistance; not to situations of utterly unfit parents who are beyond family 
assistance. Here, with the involvement of his extended family (see Point VI.C.2.), Father 
@ proved himself to be a totally unfit parent, repeatedly committing criminal custodial 
interferences involving GJC; and at gunpoint kidnapping GJC's maternal grandparents 
and absconding from the state. Thereafter, despite family involvement (Exhibit 2 at 048-
058), Father committed numerous additional criminal offenses (Tr. at 120-127; Exhibit 2 
at 010) and used methamphetamines (Exhibit 2 at 005-006) and marijuana (Tr. at 114-
115; Exhibit 3 at 034) while out on bail pending plea and sentencing for felony 
kidnapping; failed to appear for sentencing on his kidnapping charge (Exhibit 8 at 085); 
was apprehended and committed to prison for five years (id. at 086); and failed for three 
years thereafter to adjust his ability to parent. Tr. at 464-465. In other words, section 503 
could not apply to Father, a completely unfit parent, and, accordingly, the juvenile court 
never mentioned section 503 in making its termination grounds rulings. Tr. at 4 7 5-4 77. 
9 Id. at pages 2-5 and 10-11, and point VI.B.1.c, infra. 
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503. 
1. The juvenile court violated established law as it grasped for a 
possibility that the child could benefit from a relationship with 
Father or Father's extended family. 
The court repeatedly violated established law as it struggled to misapply section 
a. Established law prohibited speculation that Father could 
possibly become a fit parent. 
After finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father was an unfit parent (Tr. 
at 476), the juvenile court, referring to subsection 501(10)(d), made the following 
statements: 
I do, however, believe that this child could benefi~ from a positive, 
loving, nurturing relationship with his extended family .... And if I were to 
tenninate Dad's parental rights today, I would be going against what I think 
is best for this child in that regard. 
Now, will Dad be able to have that positive, loving, nurturing 
relationship with this child? I don't know. But what the statute says is that 
that relationship can exist. And I think we have to believe it can. But I do 
know it can exist with the second with [Father's] extended family ... And 
I think terminating the possibility for that relationship would be contrary to 
"G's" best interest. 
Tr. at 478. The court thus used the belief of possibility of a nurturing relationship 
between Father and GJC to steer its best interests analysis. However, belief and 
speculation are not this Court's tests. Rather, 
[T]he weight which a juvenile court must give any present ability evidence 
is necessarily dependent upon the amount of time during which the parent 
displayed an unwillingness or inability to improve his or her conduct and 
on any destructive effect the parent's past conduct or the parent's delay in 
rectifying the conduct has had on the parent's ability to resume a parent-
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child relationship with the child. Thus, although the court has a duty to 
look forward - - i.e., to look at the parent's present ability and the 
likelihood that the parent will be able to resume parenting within a 
reasonable time - - the court must consider such evidence in light of the 
parent's past conduct and its debilitating effect on the parent-child 
relationship. . .. 
In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 561-62, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (footnote omitted); In re B.R., 
2007 UT 82, iJ 13. Looking forward in Father's case (in light of Father's past and its 
debilitative effect on GJC), the evidence showed absolutely no likelihood that Father 
could within a reasonable time resume a parent-child relationship with GJC. Father 
testified that he was yet to serve two years in prison (Tr. at 143) and that he had made no 
adjustments. Tr. at 105-106, 108, 143, 462-465. This required the court, under section 
78A-6-509(l)(b), to find that GJC's best interest required termination of Father's parental 
rights. 
b. Established law does not allow a nice extended family to 
trump the child's _stability and permanence. 
Further, family law and related constitutional law have never suffered a "nice 
extended family" factor to override the child's best interests in being saved from an unfit 
parent. Unfit parents by definition deprive their children of stability and permanence. 
Even where the child knows and loves the parent, permanency and stability for the child 
@ override extended family connections. In re A.K., 2012 UT App 232, iJ 9, 285 P.3d 772. 
To provide GJC a relationship with Father's extended family at the necessary expense of 
retaining Father's parental rights, would be to leave the child in an insanely disruptive 
relationship with Father, a horribly unfit parent. Tr. at 465. Accordingly, no appellate 
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court has ruled that a parent must prove that a child would not benefit from a relationship 
with the extended family of an unfit parent (see Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order at ,r 33 .b.), that a relationship with the extended family of an unfit parent 
would be detrimental to the child (id. at 133.c.), or otherwise declared that "nice 
extended family" trumps stability and permanency of the child in best interests analysis. 
To the contrary, like In re A.K, none of the following cases from other states allowed 
"extended family" concerns to prevent terminations of parental rights: In re Welfare of 
Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W. 2d 895,905; KA.P. v. D.P., 11 So. 3d 812, 816, 820-21 
{Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2008);10 Miles L. v. State, 2010 Alas. LEXIS 116, unreported case;0 
In re HNS., 342 S.W.3d 344,351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011);12 In re Lauren R., 148 Cal. App. 
4th 841,855 (2007);13 In re Francisco M, Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law, 2004 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 836 (Cal. Ct. App 5th Dist 2004). 
c. Established law did not require a petitioning parent to 
prove suffering or detriment to child. 
10 
"It appears-that the (incarcerated father) is arguing that he would resume custody of the 
children upon his release from prison ... which is not in keeping with the purpose of the 
termination-of-parental-rights statute." (Cf. Father's testimony {Tr. at 445): "But 
[Father's incarceration and hard feelings of Mother and kidnapped maternal grandparents 
will] not stop me from wanting to be ... a father to my child.") 
11 Parent's history of violent behavior did not need to be directed at his children; 
extended family assertion could not override that it was not in best interests for child of 
incarcerated felon who had not obtained drug rehabilitation, lacked remorse for crime, 
and might obtain access to or custody of child upon release from prison as a result of 
retained parental rights. 
12 
"[Incarcerated] Father appears to argue that the trial court was required to value 
purported fairness to Father and his family over Child's interest in a stable and permanent 
home. Father's argument is in error." 
13 
"The overriding concern of dependency proceedings, however, is not the interest of the 
extended family members, but the interest of the child." 
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Also, to justify finding a possibility that Father could have a nurturing relationship 
GD with GJC, the juvenile court found that GJC had not emotionally or physically suffered. 
Tr. at 468,472, 478-479. However, this violated this Court's established case law 
upholding tenninations of parental rights where the child is thriving and happy. See, e.g., 
In re T.H, 2009 UT App 340, ,I 5, 2009 WL 3863681; In re C.B., 2009 UT App 290, ,I 7, 
2009 WL 3215067; In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184 at ,I 21; In re W.M W., 2004 UT App 
233, 111-2, 2004 WL 1534789 at *l; In re MC., 940 P.2d 1229, 1237, 1997 WL 348872 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997; In re N.KC., 1999 UT App 345, ,I 8, 995 P.2d l; In re Z.B., 2004 
UT App 4 77, 2004 WL 2903984, at * 1. See Guardian Ad Litem Response to Mother's 
@ Petition on Appeal at page 11. The court accordingly erred in applying its "not 
sufficiently suffering" standard. 
d. Established law does not discriminate against unmarried 
petitioners and disfavors retention of Father's status as 
legal parent where Father was unfit. 
The court improperly weighted the loss of Father as a "legal parent" for GJC 
should Father's parental rights be terminated (Tr. at 452, 477; Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order at ,I 33.a.) where Mother was, and remains, GJC's legal 
parent. Given Father's unfitness and refusal to financially support GJC, the loss of his 
@ availability as a "legal parent" would mean nothing. See In re A.K, 2012 UT App 232, 1 
35, where the court ruled: "Mother ... [argues] it would not be in Son's best interests to 
have Mother's rights terminated, because Son would then lose the right to receive 
@ financial support from Mother. . . . However, Mother has not demonstrated an ability to 
provide financial support." See IV.B. ,I 20, regarding N.B.'s and M.B.'s support. Indeed, 
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not terminating Father's rights for "legal parent" reasons was totally against the best 
interests of GJC, because, should Mother die or become incapacitated, custody of the 
child could be turned over to Father as the "legal parent." In re A.M 0., 2014 UT App 
171 at n.7. The juvenile court itself discounted this "legal parent" concern. Tr. at 477-
478. 
2. The juvenile court made erroneous rulings in attempting to 
find a possibility of a nurturing relationship between GJC 
and Father ( and thereby provide a legal relationship between 
GJC and Father's extended family). 
Although it has been shown that "the possibility of a relationship" is not a valid 
best interests factor, Mother will now address errors made by the juvenile court in 
grasping to sustain belief of a possibility that Father could become a fit parent. 
a. The juvenile court violated its duty to rule that Father 
used a gun during the kidnapping of GJC's maternal 
grand parents. 
In its ruling, the juvenile court described Father's conduct during the kidnapping 
event as "deplorable" and "horrible." Tr. at 465. The court stated, "That this is a terrible 
situation in which to place people, regardless of whether a gun was involved or not. And 
I'm not going to make that finding." Tr. at 466. The court's erroneous need to sustain a 
belief of possibility that Father could become a fit parent caused the court to violate its 
duty to rule that Father had used a gun. Father refused to answer questions regarding his 
use of a gun, invoking the Fifth Amendment. Tr. at 100, 112, 129-130. As a result, the 
grandparents' horrifying testimonies were uncontradicted that Father had pulled out a 
gun, and upon the grandmother's fleeing the car, Father exited the car and aimed the gun 
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within inches of GJC's grandmother's face, stating, "Get back in car or, I swear to God 
@ I'll blow your blanket-blank brains all over the sidewalk." Tr. at 327-328, 166-166. 
Further, "[The Utah Supreme Court] has recognized that a district court may draw an 
adverse inference from a party's assertion of his Fifth Amendment right in a civil case. 
@ 
See Gerhard v. Young, 20 Utah 2d 30, 432 P.2d 343, 343, 346-47 (1967)." Chen v. 
Stewart, 2005 UT 68, n. 4, 123 P.3d 416. As this Court has instructed trial courts to go to 
"extra lengths" to prepare findings for appellate review in those rare cases where it would 
not serve a child's best interests to terminate, In re MC., 940 P.2d at 1236, ~ 37, the court 
had duties to find that Father had viciously used a gun when he undertook to kidnap 
@ GJC's maternal grandparents, and that Father has to the present denied responsibility 
while asserting his victimhood - the alarming trait identified in AP &P Agent Carter's 
report. See supra note 6. These rulings would have made clear that a possible 
relationship with Father's extended family, derived via a terribly unfit father's parental 
rights, could only be unstable and harmful for GJC. These necessary rulings also directly 
related to Mr. Sharp's testimony that Father suffers from antisocial personality disorder. 
b. The juvenile court violated its duty to rule that during the 
run-up to the kidnapping event, Father was solely 
responsible for violating Mother's protective order and 
for custodial interferences. 
The juvenile court also erroneously declined to rule that Father was solely 
responsible for committing custodial interference requiring police involvement during the 
build-up to Father's kidnapping of GJC's grandparents. Although Father was found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Father's August 10 to August 18, 2010 custodial 
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interference (Exhibit 8 at 049), although a court commissioner had ordered the police 
involvement by writ of assistance (Exhibits 10, 11, 12), although prior to this Father had 
violated Mother's protective order and threatened Mother's lawyer and his family (Tr. at 
31-32, 461-462), and although Mother had continuously worked through her legal 
counsel in addressing the issues {Tr. at 23-40), the juvenile court found both parents 
equally responsible for the summer 2010 build-up to the kidnapping incident. Tr. at 460. 
The correct ruling would have recognized Father's conviction of violating Mother's 
protective order on July 1, 2010 (Exhibit 8 at 040) (in direct response to Mother's 
lawyer's request for Father, prose, to return GJC to Mother, Tr. at 24-27), and Father's 
conviction for the August 10 through 18, 2010 custodial interference. Exhibit 8 at 049. 
The correct ruling would have recognized that Mother was to be commended for using 
judicial process to obtain the return of GJC from Father on August 18, 2010. 14 These 
correct findings would have shown that, after being directly ordered on August 18, 2010 
to surrender GJC to Mother and to cease threatening Mother and her family, Father again 
committed custodial interference (September 29- October 6, 2010, Exhibit 8 at 063) and 
on October 6, 2010 undertook to kidnap GJC's maternal grandparents at gunpoint. These 
correct findings would have shown that there was no possibility that Father could ever 
14 There was no basis for the court's "pretty nasty, ugly custody battle" comment at Tr. at 
460. That Commissioner Gamer had chewed out both parties when he granted Mother's 
permanent protective order against Father in November 2009 (Exhibit 5; Tr. at 280-288), 
did not in the least relate to Mother's conduct, through her lawyer, during mid-2010. On 
August 18, 2010, without criticizing Mother, Commissioner Arnett ordered the writ of 
assistance, ordered Father to quit making threats, and certified Father's contempt of 
court. Exhibit 10 at 588-589; Exhibit 11; Exhibit 12. 
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have a nurturing relationship with GJC, and would have supported the conclusion that 
@ Father suffers from antisocial personality disorder. 
c. The juvenile court violated its duty to rule that Father 
suffers from antisocial personality disorder. 
Despite finding that it was "inclined to believe that [Father] does suffer from some 
type of mental health event[,]" the juvenile court side-stepped the opinion of Charles H. 
Sharp II, L.P.C., that Father met the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder. Tr. at 209-215. Although Mr. Sharp had shown how Father's documented 
history met each of the criteria (id.), 15 the court dodged the overwhelming evidence 1) by 
speculating that Mother could have provided Father with cherry-picked information (Tr. 
at 468), and 2) by stating, "I would feel so much better if his testimony had been based 
upon some type of interaction with Mr. Cronin." Id. 
Regarding the court's first concern, neither the court nor Father identified any 
historical fact regarding Father, or its applicability to any one of the related criteria, that 
was inadequate, erroneous or inapplicable. Mr. Sharp testified that he had obtained 
15 See Exhibit 20. The criteria of DSM- 5 Antisocial Personality Disorder 301.7 (F60.2) 
are: A. A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, 
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three or more of the following: 1. Failure to 
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, as indicated by repeatedly 
@ performing acts that are grounds for arrest. 2. Deceitfulness ... , 3. Impulsivity ... , 4. 
Irritability or aggressiveness ... , 5. Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, 6. 
Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by failure to sustain consistent work behavior or 
honor financial obligations, 7. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to, or 
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. B. The individual is at least 
18 years. C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years. D. 
The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. Father's juvenile record in the AP&P report, Exhibit 2 
at 012-13, reflects the onset of Father's misbehavior before he was 15 years of age. 
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Father's historical facts (Tr. at 209-210), including the AP&P report, Exhibit 2 at 012-
013, included Father's juvenile and adult records. Although Father questioned whether 
biased or incorrect information could result in a false diagnosis (Tr. at 225), and Mr. 
Sharp acknowledged that it could (id.), Father identified no information relied upon by 
Mr. Sharp that was incorrect or incorrectly applied to the criteria by Mr. Sharp. Nor did 
Father identify any omission of any relevant history regarding Father, with Mr. Sharp 
testifying, "I don't think my information was incomplete at all." Tr. at 227. The trial-
level Guardian Ad Litem did not challenge the adequacy or accuracy of the documented 
facts regarding Father (Tr. at 229-230), and neither did the Court. Tr. at 231-232. Thus, 
there was nothing before the court to allow a conclusion that documents relied upon by 
Mr. Sharp had been cherry-picked or were erroneous or inadequate. Indeed, the 
documentary evidence before the court (Exhibits 1-6, 8-16) completely supported Mr. 
Sharp's assessment of Father's history that led to Mr. Sharp's conclusion from the 
applicable criteria that Father suffers from antisocial personality disorder. 
Regarding the juvenile court's second concern, Mr. Sharp testified that a diagnosis 
of antisocial personality disorder rests upon the history of the person being evaluated and 
does not include psychological evaluation and testing. Tr. at 216, 223-224; Exhibit 20. 
Mr. Sharp had over 30 years experience using the DSM on an almost day-to-day basis 
(Tr. at 207-208), including in his providing crisis services for the community hospital. 
Tr. at 205, 223-224. He testified that he had previously "many times" diagnosed 
antisocial personality disorder without meeting or testing the subjects personally. Id. 
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Accordingly, the court should have considered Mr. Sharp's important testimony 
@ regarding the seriousness of antisocial personality disorder. 
Mr. Sharp testified that antisocial personality disorder is treated "with long-term 
individual therapy." Tr. at 217, 231-23 2. Further, the disorder "is extremely difficult to 
treat and almost always will take an extended period of time." Id. Mr. Sharp testified 
that the disorder is acquired through emulating and accepting behavior of other people 
having the disorder (Tr. at 217-219, 227-230 ), 16 and, accordingly, GJC should not be 
exposed to Father's parenting or behaviors. Tr. at 217-219, 233. Mr. Sharp accordingly 
testified that it was in GJC's best interests that Father's parental rights be terminated. Id. 
@ He further testified that termination was preferable to a "no contact" order in the parties 
divorce action, because "typically an individual with antisocial personality disorder will 
not re_cognize an order from any jurisdiction"17 and an ongoing divorce action only would 
keep the parties engaged and invite more disobediences of court orders by Father. Tr. at 
233. 
d. The juvenile court violated its duty to rule by erroneously 
deferring to a January 2011 divorce court ruling rather 
than applying juvenile court law as applicable in January 
2015. 
In seeking possibility of a relationship between Father and GJC as a best interest 
factor, rather than failing to consider Father's utter failure to adjust under Utah Code § 
16 Father testified to his problems having resulted from his exposure to an extremely 
abusive stepfather and horrible family verbal fighting. Tr. at 227-228, 233, 379. 
17 Asked if he had not been concerned about incurring the commissioner's wrath upon 
undertaking to violate the commissioner's direct order on September 29, 2010, Father 
testified, "Whatever feelings or opinions he [the commissioner] had is - - he's entitled to 
it." Tr. at 139-141. 
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78A-6-509(1)(b ), the court reached the absurd conclusion that its January 2015 juvenile 
court reasoning should be controlled by the January 2011 divorce court ruling that 
established supervised, guarded visits for Father. Exhibit 16 at 1091-1092. In its ruling, 
the juvenile court noted that the divorce court in January 2011, after the two custodial 
interferences and the kidnapping incident, still allowed Father to have supervised, 
guarded visitation with Father. Tr. at 473. The juvenile court asked, "Why would I do 
otherwise?" Tr. at 4 79. The obvious answer was that the divorce court, acting as a 
divorce court in January 2011 with Father's criminal charges pending, faced a situation 
where Father was denying all charges against him and had not yet been convicted of any 
of his crimes. Unlike the divorce court, the juvenile court in this action knew that Father 
had since been twice convicted of custodial interference, that Father had since pleaded 
guilty to felony attempted kidnapping, and that Father had for nearly three years been 
serving up-to-five years in prison. The key question of whether Father was a 
manipulative, antisocial, threatening, violent, drug-abusing kidnapper had since January 
2011 been repeatedly answered by more than clear and convincing evidence. Further, 
unlike the 2011 divorce court, the juvenile court had the absolute duty to review whether 
Father had, post-January 2011, made any effort to adjust. Utah Code§ 78A-6-509(l)(b); 
In re A.MO., 214 UT App 171, ,r 17. The court should have considered the January 2011 
to January 2015 time period to see that Father's life had only gotten worse before he 
entered prison in March 2012, including Father's new criminal offenses (Tr. at 124-129) 
and testing positive for methamphetamines with meth-related sores all over his face. 
Exhibit 2 at 005-006; Tr. at 78. And the Court should have considered that, since he was 
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committed to prison, Father had wasted three opportunities at drug rehabilitation (Tr. at 
@ 105, 463-464), that Father had never received psychotherapy (Tr. at 93-94, 465), and 
that Father was such a poor inmate that Father would be serving his entire five year 
sentence. Tr. at 143. The juvenile court should also have considered that at trial Father 
remained utterly unrepentant and still considered himself to be the victim. See supra note 
6; Tr. at 463. Accordingly, the court had the duty to find an utter failure of Father to 
adjust his circumstances (In re A.MO.) and to find that GJC's best interests required that 
Father's parental rights be terminated. 
C. The juvenile court's best interests ruling was contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. 
The juvenile court's best interests ruling was against the clear weight of the 
evidence, which reflected that Father was terribly unfit as a parent and had, over more 
than four years, made no efforts to improve his situation. Further, the court's irrelevant 
rulings that the child could benefit from a relationship with Father's extended family and 
that the child did not suffer were also against the clear weight of the evidence. The 
@ evidence strongly supports firm and definite conviction that mistakes have been made. In 
re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 1 12. 
1. The juvenile court's termination grounds were supported by 
clear and convincing evidence which also required a best 
interests finding that Father's parental rights should be 
terminated. 
"' As a practical matter, where grounds for termination are established, the 
@ conclusion that termination will be in the children's best interests follows almost 
automatically."' In re A.MO., 2014 UT App 171,120,332 P.3d 372 (quoting In re. 
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J.D., 2011 UT at 134) (emphasis added). The same clear and convincing evidence that 
supported the juvenile court's termination grounds rulings calls for the conclusion that 
the best interests of GJC requires termination of Father's parental rights. 
Unfitness (§ 78A-6-507(1)(c)). The evidence showed that Father had exhibited 
antisocial behavior since adolescence (see VI.B.2.c. above), and that during the parties' 
marriage Father had used illicit drugs (Tr. at 237-238), had serious anger management 
issues, including road rage and rages at Mother (Tr. at 236-39), and had depression and 
suicidal ideations. Tr. at 236-237. Father's rages at Mother increased when Mother 
separated from Father (Tr. at 238-239), resulting in the wave of Father's criminal 
behaviors and convictions. Father's aggressive driving continued while he was out on 
bail pending plea and sentencing in the kidnapping case, with Father being charged with 
reckless driving (Tr. at 125), careless driving (Tr. at 121, 125), lane change violation (id.) 
as well driving on suspension related to a DUI. Id. Father's drug use continued during 
the same time period, with Father admitting to using marijuana (Exhibit 3 at 034), testing 
positive for methamphetamines for AP&P agent Carter (Tr. at 78), and with Father being 
charged with driving with a measurable controlled substance. Tr. at 124-125. Father's 
illicit drug use continued unabated even after he was imprisoned (Exhibit 1 at 031, 
Exhibit 2 at 030), with Father three times being expelled from prison drug treatment 
programs. Tr. at 105. 
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The juvenile court found that Father used GJC as a pawn. 18 Tr. at 469. The 
@ evidence was uncontroverted that during the summer and fall of 2010, Father engaged in 
a series of crimes that directly involved or related to the minor child (Tr. at 119-120, 123, 
127), that violated increasingly stem orders by the divorce court19 (Tr. at 36-38; Exhibit 
10), and that showed that Father was incapable of ever putting the best interests of the 
minor child before his own antisocial urges.20 A common factor in all of Father's 
18 Father clearly objectified GJC in Father's worldview of himself as victim. On March 
21, 2011, just prior to his scheduled arraignment in the kidnapping case (Exhibit 8 at 
076), Father presented himself as suicidal to the LDS Hospital behavioral health unit. 
Father told intake personnel, "If I can't be a father, I'd rather not be here." Tr. at 114-
117; Exhibit 3 at 0017, 0034. Father further stated he had been in "a vicious custody 
battle over the past year and a half. The patient states that he has been wrongly accused 
of 'kidnapping my child at gunpoint' which he emphatically states is incorrect. ... He 
states he does not know why they will not allow him to see his 3-year-old boy." Tr. at 
116; Exhibit 3 at 061. Mother testified that Father used GJC as a "tool to just hurt me 
and to terrorize me at 'G's expense" (Tr. at 270) and that Father offered to trade GJC for 
a car title. Tr. at 251-252, 311; Exhibit 18 at 00790-791. 
19 The September 29-October 6, 2010 events followed on the heels of the August 18, 
2010 divorce court hearing where the commissioner specifically ordered Father to cease 
threatening Mother, her attorney and their respective families. Exhibit 10 at 589; Tr. at 
40. 
20 See Utah Code§ 78A-6-508(6): "The following circumstances constitute prima facie 
evidence of unfitness: (b) conviction of a crime, if the facts surrounding the crime are of 
such a nature as to indicate unfitness of the parent to prove adequate care to the extent 
necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development[.]" See 
also, as prima facie evidence of unfitness and neglect, subsection (2): (a) "emotional 
illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency ... that renders the parent unable to care for . 
. . the emotional needs of the child;" (b) conduct towards child of ... emotionally .. . 
cruel or abusive nature;" (c) "habitual use of ... drugs that render the parent unfit ... ;" 
(e) "whether parent is incarcerated as a result of conviction of a felony, and sentence is of 
such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more than one year;" (f) 
"a history of violent behavior." These were fully supported by the evidence and were 
argued by Mother's counsel at Tr. at 428-424. The court found mental illness (Tr. at 
464-465), habitual use of drugs (Tr. at 462-464 ), incarcerated as the result of a felony 
(Tr. at 464 ), child deprived of normal home for more than one year (Tr. at 465), and 
history of violent behavior. Tr. at 476. 
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offenses was Father's repeated, lengthy withholdings of GJC from GJC's scheduled time 
with Mother, who had been awarded temporary sole physical custody. Exhibit 9. During 
the last of his wrongful withholdings of GJC (September 29-October 6, 2010), Father 
repeatedly used GJC as a pawn to GJC's detriment: 1) Father, attempting to force 
Mother to speak to him by telephone, left a sadistic voicemail on Mother's phone of GJC, 
in the background crying for Mother to come and get him as Father urged GJC, "Tell 
your mommy to come and get you" {Tr. at 136, 257-258); 2) Father made his false offer 
to surrender GJC to Mother (via her parents) as the lure to draw Mother and her parents 
into his anned kidnapping scheme (Tr. at 141-142); and 3) Father violently kidnapped 
Mother's parents at gunpoint, attempting to force Mother's parents to take Father to 
Mother in violation of Mother's protective order. 21 The armed kidnapping incident 
resulted in law enforcement intervention to locate GJC in the possession of Father's sister 
{Tr. at 268-269, 362-365; Exhibit 17 at 917). In absconding to Wendover, Nevada to 
avoid arrest, Father abandoned GJC, leaving GJC in an environment of extreme 
emotional trauma and fear, with Mother, her parents and GJC required to hide at a hotel 
to assure their safety until law enforcement officers could find and apprehend Father. Tr. 
at 269-272. To the present, Father has left GJC in a continuing atmosphere of fear and 
trauma as Mother and her parents await Father's release from prison in 2017. Tr. at 168-
169, 187,270,468. Father was sentenced to prison and, by date of trial herein, had not 
seen GJC for nearly three years. Tr. at 417. Although Father sent a few cards to GJC 
21 On August 16, 2010, Father had attempted to barter release of GJC to Mother in return 
for a car title. Tr. at 251-252, 311; Exhibit 18 at 00790-791. 
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@ 
from prison, Mother did not give the cards to GJC. Tr. at 296. Since 2009, Father had 
@ paid only $1,000 in ordered child support and was multiple tens of thousands of dollars 
behind in his child support obligation by the time of trial. Tr. at 20-22, 124. 
Accordingly, the court, by clear and convincing evidence, found unfitness as a ground for 
termination. Tr. at 476. 
Abandonment(§ 78A-6-507(l)(a)). The foregoing evidence showed, and the 
court concluded, that Father had abandoned GJC, including by having failed to 
communicate with GJC for more than six months (in fact, nearly three years). See Utah 
Code § 78A-6-508(6)(l)(b). Tr. at 465, 475. 
Neglect(§ 78A-6-507(l)(b)). The foregoing evidence showed, and the court 
concluded, that Father had neglected GJC by, through his deserved incarceration, 
depriving GJC of a normal home for more than one year. Tr. at 465, 476. The evidence 
strongly met the prima facie evidence factors at Utah Code§ 78A-6-508(2), discussed 
supra at note 20. Tr. at 428-433. 
Token efforts to support and communicate(§ 78A-6-507(1)(O(i)). The evidence 
showed, and the court concluded, that Father had made less than token efforts to support 
and communicate with GJC. Tr. at 20-22 (single thousand dollar payment), 38-39, 99, 
114 ("could be working but no incentive"), 124, 153-55 (Father vowed he would never 
pay child support), 170-172, 184-85, 191-192 (maternal grandfather provided health 
insurance), 271-272, 331-332, 376 (Father admitted to the court: "Admittedly, [total 
support payments, even if coming to Father's estimate of $2,500] were token at best"). 
The court found Father's financial support of GJC "extraordinarily lacking." Tr. at 459. 
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Token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent(§ 78A-6-507(1)(f)(ii)). The evidence 
showed, and the court concluded, that Father had made less than token efforts to avoid 
being an unfit parent. See Tr. at 462-465 and 477, 105-106 and 108 (Father three times 
being expelled from prison drug treatment programs with no intention to again attempt 
drug rehab); 108 and 143 (due to failure to follow prison rules, Father expects to serve 
full five year sentence); 93-94, 108, and 217 (in need of long-term therapy, Father 
refused to participate in therapy, with court finding at Tr. at 465 "severe lack of follow-
through") (cf In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ,r 3, where the parent "began, but did not complete, 
three substance abuse programs. . .. She attended only a few mental health counseling 
sessions."). Most alarming is Father's uncorrected refusal to accept responsibility and to 
cease viewing himself as the victim - see supra note 6. The court, like AP&P (id.), 
found this negative trait to be "extremely compelling." Tr. at 462--463. This uncorrected 
character defect, which led Father to commit his crimes without remorse (Id.), leaves 
GJC at extreme risk and completely disproves the court's (irrelevant) finding that Father 
could possibly become a fit parent. 
Having found by clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit as a parent, 
had abandoned his child, had neglected his child, and had made only token efforts to 
communicate with or support his child, "the conclusion that termination will be in the 
children's best interests follows almost automatically." In re A.MO., 2014 UT App 171, 
at ,r 20. "Cases where grounds for termination are found but termination is held not to be 
in the child's best interests are rare." In re. J.D. at ,r 35 (emphasis added). The rare cases 
have involved situations where children under state foster care jurisdiction were in limbo 
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pending the location of an adoptive parent, In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ,r 23, 991 
@ P.2d 1118, In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ,r 14, 21 P.3d 680, and where a father 
manipulated the termination statute to attempt to avoid paying child support. In re 
B.MS., 2003 UT App 51, ,r,r 17-20, 65 P.3d 639. Neither of these situations is present 
here. GJC was/is not under state foster care jurisdiction. Mother was/is already the legal 
parent of GJC and ready to continue her proven care of GJC, consistent with the 
permanency and stability policy of Utah's child welfare laws (In re JP., 921 P.2d 1012, 
1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)) assisted by her parent's proven and committed financial 
assistance. Tr. at 157, 170-171, 331. And Mother is not a parent seeking termination of 
@ parental rights to avoid her obligation of support. 
In light of Father's utter failure to adjust, Father's history of deliberately violating 
divorce court orders (escalating to the point of violent felony crimes against Mother's 
parents), shows that to leave GJC subject to Mother's and Father's divorce action would 
be disastrous.22 Upon release from prison, Father would surely make GJC's and 
Mother's lives living hell as he would continue to perceive divorce action/justice system 
rules unfair to him and as he would continue to view GJC, his son, as an object of 
Father'·s rights and needs. Tr. at 469; point VI.C.2. Termination of Father's parental 
rights would remove Father from ongoing contact with Mother, GJC and the divorce 
22 The trial level Guardian Ad Litem's suggestion that GJC could be protected by a "no 
contact" order with Father remaining as the legal parent was absurd. First, whether such 
an order could be obtained from the divorce court was speculative. Second, consider 
Father's reaction when ORS ("the system") would attempt to collect child support from 
Father as the divorce court ("the system") deprived Father of contact with Father's son 
through a no contact order. Father's mother testified that Father unraveled due to 
Father's perception that the system was completely unfair to him. Tr. at 369-370. 
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court, greatly minimizing opportunities for Father to fight "the system" at GJC's expense. 
Tr. at 233. Accordingly, the court's best interests ruling was against the clear weight of 
the evidence and/or the evidence strongly supports firm and definite convictions that 
mistakes have been made. 
2. Besides being irrelevant to best interests considerations, the 
evidence did not reflect that GJC could benefit from a continued 
relationship with Father's extended family. 
The court's irrelevant ruling that the child could benefit from a relationship with 
Father's extended family was contrary to the weight of the evidence. In ruling, "I simply 
do not believe that Mr. Cronin's extended family knowingly participated in any type of 
event" (Tr. at 470), the juvenile court failed to consider that during both incidents where 
Father was subsequently convicted of custodial interference (August I 0-18, 2010 and 
September 29-October 6, 20 I 0), Father's mother and/or sister had the minor child in 
their possession(s) as law enforcement officers executed the two writs of assistance. Tr. 
at 34-36, 249, 255-256, 268-269, 362-365. By keeping GJC while Father went to the 
OTSC/Writ of Assistance hearing on August 18, 2010 (Tr. at 255-56), Father's mother 
enabled Father to appear before the divorce court without bringing GJC to Mother at 
court. This caused the commissioner to restrain Father at court while law enforcement 
assisted Mother to obtain the child from Father's mother. Tr. at 34-36, 255-256; Exhibit 
10 at 558. Father's sister had possession of GJC on October 6, 20 IO when Father 
undertook his plan to kidnap Mother and her parents. Tr. at 141-142; 268-269; Exhibit 2 
at 003-004; Exhibit 17 at 917. Father's mother and sister obstructed law enforcement 
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officers' efforts to determine the whereabouts of GJC during the October 6, 2010 
kidnapping incident. Tr. at 268-269, 362-365; Exhibit 17 at 917. 
The juvenile court ignored the foregoing evidence and also ignored Exhibit 1 at 
UDC00037: "11/30/2011 Todd Carter made a supervision contact ... His [Father's] 
sister is an enabler and answered his sentences for him;" (emphasis added.) The juvenile 
court also ignored Father's sister's letter acknowledging to the sentencing judge in the 
kidnapping case that she (Father's sister) was an enabler. "My name is Cheri Monet 
Cronin. I ... work as a Paralegal ... I can assure you that Joshua will have to remain 
accountable and honest ifhe chooses to maintain my support. I will not enable him to 
self destruct. ... " Exhibit 2 at 055-056. ( emphases in original.) 
Father's mother, likewise, was an enabler. She attributed Father's continued drug 
use and many criminal offenses ( occuring between the October 6, 2010 kidnapping 
incident and Father's commitment to prison in March 2012) to father's losing "all hope 
and faith in -- the system." Tr. at 369-370, 343. Father's mother viewed GJC as an 
object necessary for Father's self-esteem and redemption; to the judge in the kidnapping 
case she wrote, "I cannot imagine the emotional and developmental impact it would have 
on [GJC's]'s life if they had to go for an extended time without seeing each other. 
Further, I know [Father] would lose all hope ofredemption."23 (emphasis added) 
Exhibit 2 at 050; Tr. at 366, 369. 
Further, to continue the possibility of Father's extended family having a 
relationship with GJC required that Father's legal status as GJC's father continue, w~ich 
23 See supra note 18, regarding Father objectifying GJC. 
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prospect has been shown to be completely contrary to GJC's needs for stability and 
permanence. 
3. Rather than showing that GJC had not suffered (another 
irrelevant factor), the evidence showed that Father had caused 
GJC to suffer substantial emotional trauma. 
The evidence showed that GJC suffered as a result of Father's unfit parenting. 
Father's line of questioning of Mother emphasized that a child lacking relationships with 
its father and the father's extended family, would suffer from such losses. Tr. at 301-
311. Ironically, absent from GJC's life due to his criminal actions, Father made the point 
that a child suffers in the absence of a father. Tr. at 301-305. During Father's 
questioning, Mother testified that Father's behaviors had traumatized GJC. GJC's 
maternal grandfather testified that he ceased facilitating transfers of GJC from Mother to 
Father, because grandfather could not cope with the screaming and crying GJC exhibited 
whenever GJC was taken to be exchanged to Father. Tr. at 159-160. Mother testified 
about Father's sadistic voicemail on Mother's phone days before the October 6, 2010 
kidnapping, during which GJC, traumatized by being away from Mother so long, 
screamed and cried for his mother in the background. Tr. at 257-258. Days prior to the 
kidnappings while unlawfully keeping GJC from Mother, on October 2, 2010, Father 
texted Mother, " ... G_ wants to talk to ya. He misses his mommy babe" Exhibit 18 
at 867-869. 
The court itself stated that GJC's loss of his relationship with Father's mother 
must have been devastating to GJC. Tr. at 470. The court also decried the effect the 
many police assistances must have had on GJC. Tr. at 248, 459. Mother testified that 
so 
GJC still received therapy from Mr. Sharp. Tr. at 316. That GJC was, after years away 
® from Father, described as a "happy little boy" supports best interests termination, rather 
than the mistaken idea that GJC did not suffer from Father's conduct. 
D. Mother's case and GJC's best interests were prejudiced by the 
Guardian Ad Litem's deprivation of effective assistance of counsel to 
GJC, and by the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem's misrepresentation of 
law to the juvenile court. 
GJC was denied effective counsel at trial. Guardian Ad Litem Response to 
Mother's Petition on Appeal at note 8. Pursuant to her regional office's categorical 
policy of opposing all termination petitions where there is no adopting father in the 
wings, 24 the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem throughout the litigation opposed Mother's 
petition for termination. Late during the first day of trial, during the maternal 
grandfather's testimony, the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem incredibly stated, "I've been 
sitting here all day, and all I know about "G" is his name" (Tr. at 191), thus alerting the 
court that the trial-level Guardian Ad Litem was not prepared to competently represent 
GJC. However, rather than expressing concern regarding the Guardian Ad Litem's 
@ ignorance of GJC, in its ruling the juvenile court stated, "Much like the guardian, I was 
surprised by the absence of testimony from [Mr. Sharp] as to what psychological damage 
Ci 24 The trial-level Guardian Ad Litem stated, as her first point of her argument that there 
was no adoptive father (Tr. at 448) and at the conclusion of her argument, "If this was a 
child welfare case and if the State were involved, I think it likely that the State would not 
recommend termination in this case unless there was an adoptive parent." Tr. at 451. 
This categorical position violated this Court's rulings that the lack of an adoptive 
placement at the time of a termination of parental rights trial does not preclude a 
Ci determination that termination is in a child's best interests, In re MD., 2014 UT App 225, 
,I 3, 336 P.3d 585 (citing In re J.D., 2011 UT App at 123), particularly where the other 
legal parent is petitioning. 
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or effects that this child may be experiencing or suffering from."25 Tr. at 468. Although 
it should have been surprised at the Guardian Ad Litem's ignorance of GJC's best 
interests, the juvenile court erroneously proceeded to substantially adopt the trial-level 
Guardian Ad Litem' s closing argument which misrepresented Utah law as badly as the 
Guardian Ad Litem misrepresented GJC. Tr. at 454-480. This prejudiced Mother's case 
as well as GJC's best interests. 
The appeal-level Guardian Ad Litem has acknowledged that the trial-level 
Guardian Ad Litem rendered ineffective assistance to GJC (see Guardian Ad Litem 
Response to Mother's Petitioner on Appeal at note 8), and has urged this Court to reverse 
~he juvenile court's best interests ruling and to order the termination of Father's parental 
rights. Id. at pages 14-15. The appeal-level Guardian Ad Litem states that the regional 
office's misapprehensions of the law and its duties to its child clients have since been 
remedied by the Director. Id. It remains for this Court to remedy the obvious errors 
herein by reversing the juvenile court's best interests ruling and ordering the termination 
of Father's parental rights. 
VII. Conclusion. 
The facts and law overwh~lmingly required a finding that GJC's best interests 
required that Father's parental rights be terminated. GJC's need for stability and 
permanence cannot tolerate Father's continued involvement in GJC's life. Accordingly, 
25 When Mr. Sharp testified early the second day of trial, the trial-level Guardian Ad 
Litem did not question Mr. Sharp regarding GJC's emotional health. Tr. at 231-232. 
Although, the Guardian referred to a lack of testimony from Mr. Sharp regarding this 
issue in her closing argument (Tr. at 450), the Guardian did not, and could not, express 
surpnse. 
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this Court should reverse the juvenile court's best interests finding and order the 
@ termination of Father's parental rights. 
VIII. Addendum. 
Utah Code sections 62A-4a-103(2)(b); 78A-6-503(4), (7), (IO)(b); 78A-6-507; 
@ 78A-6-508, and 78A-6-509(l)(b) follow. 
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62A-4a-103 Division .... Creation -- Purpose. 
(1) 
(a) There is created the Division of Child and Family Services within the department, under the 
administration and general supervision of the executive director. 
(b) The division is the child, youth, and family services authority of the state and has all functions, 
powers, duties, rights, and responsibilities created in accordance with this chapter, except 
those assumed by the department. 
(2) 
(a) The primary purpose of the division is to provide child welfare services. 
(b) The division shall, when possible and appropriate, provide in-home services for the 
preservation of families in an effort to protect the child from the trauma of separation from his 
family, protect the integrity of the family, and the constitutional rights of parents. In keeping 
with its ultimate goal and purpose of protecting children, however, when a child's welfare is 
endangered or reasonable efforts to maintain or reunify a child with his family have failed, the 
division shall act in a timely fashion in accordance with the requirements of this chapter and 
Title 78A, Chapter 6, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, to proVide the 
child wi~h a stable, permanent environment. 
(3) The division shall also provide domestic violence services in accordance with federal law. 
Amended by Chapter 265, 2014 General Session 
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78A-6-503 Judicial process for termination -- Parent unfit or incompetent -- Best interest of 
child. 
(1) Under both the United States Constitution and the constitution of this state, a parent possesses 
a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the parent's child.· For 
this reason, the termination of family ties by the state may only be done for compelling reasons. 
(2) The court shall provide a fundamentally fair process to a parent if a party moves to terminate 
parental rights. 
(3) If the party moving to terminate parental rights is a governmental entity, the court shall find that 
any actions or allegations made in opposition to the rights and desires of a parent regarding the 
parent's child are supported by sufficient evidence to satisfy a parent's constitutional entitlement 
to heightened protection against government interference with the parent's fundamental rights 
and liberty interests. 
(4) The fundamental liberty interest of a parent concerning the care, custody, and management of 
the parent's child is recognized, protected, and does not cease to exist simply because a parent 
may fail to be a model parent or because the parent's child is placed in the temporary custody 
of the state. The court should give serious consideration to the fundamental right of a parent 
to rear the parent's child, and concomitantly, of the right of the child to be reared by the child's 
natural parent. 
(5) At all times, a parent retains a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of family 
life. 
(6) Prior to an adjudication of unfitness, government action in relation to a parent and a parent's 
chi.Id may not exceed the least restrictive means or alternatives available to accomplish a 
compelling state interest. 
(7) Until parental unfitness is established and the children suffer, or are substantially likely to suffer, 
serious detriment as a result, the child and the child's parent share a vital interest in preventing 
erroneous termination of their relationship and the court may not presume that a child and the 
child's parents are adversaries. 
(8) It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision of 
the child's natural parents. A child's need for a normal family life in a permanent home, and 
for positive, nurturing family relationships is usually best met by the child's natural parents. 
Additionally, the integrity of the family unit and the right of parents to conceive and raise 
their children are constitutionally protected. For these reasons, the court should only transfer 
custody of a child from the child's natural parent for compelling reasons and when there is a 
jurisdictional ba_sis to do so. 
(9) The right of a fit, competent parent to raise the parent's child without undue government 
interference is a fundamental liberty interest that has long been protected by the laws and 
Constitution of this state and of the United States, and is a fundamental public policy of this 
state. 
(10) The state recognizes that: 
(a) a parent has the right, obligation, responsibility, and authority to raise, manage1 train, 
educate, provide for, and reasonably discipline the parent's children; and 
(b) the state's role is secondary and supportive to the primary role of a parent. 
(c) It is the public policy of this state that parents retain the fundamental right and duty to exercise 
primary control over the care, supervision, upbringing, and education of their children. 
(d) The interests of the state favor preservation and not severance of natural familial bonds in 
situations where a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship can exist, including extended 
family association and support. 
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(11) This part provides a judicial process for voluntary and involuntary severance of the parent-
child relationship, designed to safeguard the rights and interests of all parties concerned and 
promote their welfare and that of the state. 
(12) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved, but if a parent is found, 
by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any of the grounds 
for termination described in this part, the court shall then consider the welfare and best interest 
of the child of paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental rights shall 
be ordered. 
Amended by Chapter 340, 2013 General Session 
Page2 
Utah Code 
78A-6-507 Grounds for termination of parental rights -- Findings regarding reasonable 
efforts. 
(1') Subject to the protections and requirements of Section 78A-6-503, and if the court finds strictly 
necessary, the court may terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent if the court finds 
any one of the following: 
(a) that the parent has abandoned the child; 
(b) that the parent has neglected or abused the child; 
(c) that the parent is unfit or incompetent; 
(d) 
(i) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the 
court or the division; 
(ii) that the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling 
to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement; and 
(iii) that there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper 
and effective parental care in the near future; 
(e) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this chapter; 
(f) that only token efforts have been made by the parent: 
(i) to support or communicate with the child; 
(ii) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(iii) to eliminate the risk of serious harm to the child; or 
(iv) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(g) 
(i) that the parent has voluntarily relinquished the parent's parental rights to the child; and 
(ii) that termination is in the child's best interest; 
(h) that, after a period of trial during which the child was returned to live in the child's own home, 
the parent substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection; or 
(i) the terms and conditions of safe relinquishment of a newborn child have been complied with, 
pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 8, Safe Relinquishment of a Newborn Child. 
(2) The court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent because the parent has failed to 
complete the requirements of a child and family plan. 
(3) 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3}(b), in any case in which the court has directed the 
division to provide reunification services to a parent, the court must find that the division made 
reasonable efforts to provide those services before the court may terminate the parent's rights 
under Subsection (1 )(b), (c), (d), (e), (f). or (h). 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(a), the court is not required to make the finding under 
Subsection (3)(a) before terminating a parent's rights: 
(i) under Subsection (1)(b), if the court finds that the abuse or neglect occurred subsequent to 
adjudication; or 
(ii) if reasonable efforts to provide the services described in Subsection (3)(a) are not required 
under federal law, and federal law is not inconsistent with Utah law. 
Amended by Chapter 281, 2012 General Session 
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78A-6-508 Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence 
of abandonment that the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the child, 
and for a period of six months following the surrender have not manifested to the child or to 
the person having the physical custody of the child a firm intention to resume physical custody 
or to make arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six months; 
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause; or 
· (d) have abandoned an infant, as described in Subsection 78A-6-316(1). 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or have neglected a child the court shall 
consider, but is not limited to, the following circumstances, conduct, or conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent that renqers the parent 
unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for 
extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled substances, or dangerous drugs 
that render the parent unable to care for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, 
education, or other care necessary for the child's physical, mental, and emotional. health and 
development by a parent or parents who are capable of providing that care; 
(e) whether the parent is incarcerated as a result of conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of 
such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more than one year; 
(f) a history of violent behavior; or 
(g) whether the parent has intentionally exposed the child to pornography or material harmful to a 
minor, as defined in Section 76-10-1201. 
(3) A parent who, legitimately practicing the parent's religious beliefs, does not provide specified 
medical treatment for a child is not, for that reason alone, a negligent or unfit parent. 
(4) 
(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a parent may not be considered neglectful or unfit because of 
a health care decision made for a child by the child's parent unless the state or other party to 
the proceeding shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that the health care decision is not 
reasonable and informed. 
(b) Nothing in Subsection (4)(a) may prohibit a parent from exercising the right to obtain a second 
health care opinion. 
(5) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division and the parent or parents fail to comply 
substantially with the terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the date on which 
the child was placed or th~ plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply 
is evidence of failure of parental adjustment. 
(6) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evidence of unfitness: 
(a) sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, injury, or death of a sibling of the child, 'Of of any child, due 
to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by the parent or parents; 
(b) conviction of a crime, if the facts surrounding the crime are of such a nature as to indicate 
the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate care to the extent necessary for the child's 
physical, mental, or emotional health and development; 
(c) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury to or disfigurement of the child; 
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. (d) the parent has committed, aided, abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit murder 
· .. · . · or manslaughter of a child or child abuse homicide; or 
· (e). the parent intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the death of another parent of the 
child, without legal justification. 
Amended by Chapter 409, 2014 General Session 
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-78A-6-509 Specific considerations where child is not in physical custody of parent . 
. (1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or parents, the c·ourt,-in determining 
. whether parental rights should be terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: 
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child and his desires regarding 
the termination, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to express his desires; and 
(b) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust their circumstances; conduct, or 
conditions to make it in the child's best interest to return him to his home after a reasonable 
length of time, including but not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance, if financially 
able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular parent-time or other contact with the child that was designed and 
carried out in a plan to reunite the child with the parent or parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard incidental conduct, contributions, 
contacts, and communications. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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